Title: “Incentive Compatible Information Disclosure”
Abstract: This paper studies the optimal disclosure of information about an agent’s quality when it is a combination of a component privately observed by the agent and another latent component. Upon soliciting a report from the agent about his private observation, a principal performs a test which reveals the latent component. The principal then discloses information to the market/public which rewards the agent with compensation equal to the agent’s expected quality. We study incentive compatible disclosure rules that minimize the mismatch between the agent’s true and expected qualities while inducing truthful reporting from the agent. The optimal rule entails full disclosure when the agent’s quality is a supermodular function of the two components, but entails probabilistic pooling when it is submodular. We express the optimization problem as a linear transformation of the mean dual-belief, which describes the joint distribution of prior and mean posterior beliefs under disclosure, and obtain the optimal disclosure rule as a corner solution to this linear problem. We identify the number of messages required under the optimal rule and relate it to the agent’s incentive compatibility conditions.
Aoyagi 교수는 미시경제이론 분야의 권위자로서, 정보공개가 개인의 유인과 어떻게 맞물리는지에 대한 이론적 분석을 소개하였습니다. 또한, 연세대학교 대학원생 및 교수진은 세계적인 학술지 International Economic Review의 부편집장이기도 한 Aoyagi 교수와의 교류를 통해 최신 연구 동향을 접하고 네트워크를 넓힐 수 있는 기회를 가졌습니다.
2월 27일 대우관 323호에서 경제학과 BK 초청 세미나가 진행되었습니다.
[발표 연사 및 주제]
Title: “Incentive Compatible Information Disclosure”
Abstract: This paper studies the optimal disclosure of information about an agent’s quality when it is a combination of a component privately observed by the agent and another latent component. Upon soliciting a report from the agent about his private observation, a principal performs a test which reveals the latent component. The principal then discloses information to the market/public which rewards the agent with compensation equal to the agent’s expected quality. We study incentive compatible disclosure rules that minimize the mismatch between the agent’s true and expected qualities while inducing truthful reporting from the agent. The optimal rule entails full disclosure when the agent’s quality is a supermodular function of the two components, but entails probabilistic pooling when it is submodular. We express the optimization problem as a linear transformation of the mean dual-belief, which describes the joint distribution of prior and mean posterior beliefs under disclosure, and obtain the optimal disclosure rule as a corner solution to this linear problem. We identify the number of messages required under the optimal rule and relate it to the agent’s incentive compatibility conditions.
Aoyagi 교수는 미시경제이론 분야의 권위자로서, 정보공개가 개인의 유인과 어떻게 맞물리는지에 대한 이론적 분석을 소개하였습니다.
또한, 연세대학교 대학원생 및 교수진은 세계적인 학술지 International Economic Review의 부편집장이기도 한 Aoyagi 교수와의 교류를 통해 최신 연구 동향을 접하고 네트워크를 넓힐 수 있는 기회를 가졌습니다.
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